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I. INTRODUCTION
I have not actually counted, but my strong impression is that in
Professor Levinson's engaging lecture on "Compromise and
Constitutionalism," the ratio of question marks to periods is much higher
than in most English prose. His lecture raises lots of questions and offers
only a few very tentative answers. And this cautious approach seems
appropriate to the subject. The ethics of compromise essentially involve the
problem of how to live morally in a morally disordered world-a world in
which the people we live with and care about are morally disordered, and in
which we know that but not always when or how we ourselves are morally
disordered. It would be surprising if there were clean, orderly, demonstrable
solutions to that problem.
Levinson is right, I think, to steer away from the extremes. At one
extreme, one might conclude that every choice boils down to a simple matter
of "calculating the costs and benefits"-an approach Levinson says
Alexander Bickel attributed to Justice Brandeis in the matter of dissenting
opinions.' The practical danger of this approach is obvious enough-those
who take it will end up sacrificing their integrity and their moral
commitments altogether. The familiar anecdote about Churchill and the
woman who indignantly rejects an indecent proposition for five pounds but
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I thank Larry Alexander
for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. See Sanford Levinson, Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 821, 839-40
(2011).
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admits she would accept a proposition for five million pounds seems
pertinent here.2
At the other extreme, what we might call the "purity position" views
willingness to compromise as a kind of moral deficiency: ideally, a person-
or a judge or politician-should always act in accordance with his or her
highest moral commitments and should never enter into commerce with
persons or parties who reject or depart from those commitments. Though
sometimes describing compromise as a "temptation", Levinson nonetheless
appears to reject the purity position, and so would I.3 In fact, I regard the
purity position as profoundly immoral.4 Purists are morally self-indulgent, I
believe, valuing their own virtue above the welfare of their fellows. They
incline to hubris, because they fail to take seriously the possibility that they
might be wrong and that those who disagree with them may be right. In
assuming their own superior virtue, they fall into self-deception, like the
Pharisee in Jesus' parable of the Pharisee and the publican.s Political purists
endowed with power (of which the twentieth century had more than its
share) are particularly reprehensible: in their self-serving certainty they can
inflict vast suffering on those around them.
So, what to do? If compromise is morally perilous but also necessary-
not only practically but morally necessary-and if there is no comprehensive
body of categorical rules telling us when to compromise and when to hold
firm, are we then relegated to completely ad hoc, intuition-driven choices?
Or are there at least presumptive precepts that might guide us in confronting
these challenges?
II. THE MARGALIT-LEVINSON PRINCIPLE
In the course of his lecture, Levinson identifies some relevant factors or
criteria, and he also appears to endorse a principle proposed by the Israeli
philosopher Avishai Margalit for distinguishing "merely dreadful
compromises," as Levinson puts it, from "rotten compromises" that come
2.
Churchill: "Madam, would you sleep with me for five million pounds?"
Socialite: "My goodness, Mr. Churchill .. . Well, I suppose ... we would have to discuss
terms, of course .... "
Churchill: "Would you sleep with me for five pounds?"
Socialite: "Mr. Churchill, what kind of woman do you think I am?!"
Churchill: "Madam, we've already established that. Now we are haggling about the
price."
Churchill Humor, JOKES (June 28, 2007, 1:51 AM), http://jo-kes.blogspot.com/2007/06/churchill-
humor.html.
3. See Levinson, supra note 1, at 843.
4. In criticizing the purity position and its general condemnation of compromise, I do not mean
to deny the possibility of moral absolutes or categorical commands and prohibitions. See JOHN
FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES: TRADITION, REVISION, AND TRUTH (1991).
5. Luke 18:9-14.
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too close to being categorically forbidden.6 The kind of compromise that is
never or almost never acceptable is one that "agrees 'to establish or maintain
an inhuman regime, a regime of cruelty and humiliation, that is, a regime
that does not treat humans as humans."" Using this principle, Levinson
seems to conclude, albeit faintly, that it was permissible for the
Constitution's framers to compromise on the composition of the Senate but
not to support a Constitution that accepted and protected slavery.8 Slavery,
after all, surely treated a class of human beings in an inhuman, cruel, and
humiliating fashion.
I believe that Margalit's principle overlooks a crucial distinction, and I
accordingly find Levinson's discussion of the problem of slavery and the
Constitution engaging but ultimately unpersuasive. To explain why, I want
to introduce another famous example of constitutional controversy from
American history that also involved slavery. More specifically, I want to
briefly consider the approach to slavery that Abraham Lincoln took in the
Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858. From Lincoln's position I believe we can
glean two precepts for acceptable compromise that are different than the
principle to which Margalit and Levinson appeal. Using these precepts, I
will then briefly reflect on the three problems that Levinson discusses.
III. LINCOLN'S GUIDING PRECEPTS
Lincoln and his opponent, Stephen A. Douglas, are remembered as
having clashed on the issue of slavery, but in fact there were important
points of similarity.9 Neither Lincoln nor Douglas was a purist. Both
understood that slavery was a reality in the United States, that the
Constitution protected the institution, and that it would be irresponsible as
well as politically impossible for the national government peremptorily to
abolish the institution. Like Douglas, Lincoln insisted on the right of the
6. Levinson, supra note 1, at 826.
7. Id. Query: under this principle would it ever have been permissible for the United States to
enter into trade or diplomatic agreements with the Soviet Union or other Communist countries?
8. See id. at 835 ("One might easily say .... with regard to the two 'great compromises of
1787,' that the one with slavery was truly 'rotten,' while the capitulation to Delaware and other
small states regarding voting power in the Senate was merely 'dreadful."').
9. See, e.g., THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 99 (Rodney 0. Davis & Douglas L. Wilson eds.,
2008) (third debate).
There is very much in the principles that Judge Douglas has here enunciated that I most
cordially approve, and over which I shall have no controversy with him. In so far as he
has insisted that all the states have the right to do exactly as they please about all their
domestic relations, including that of slavery, I agree entirely with him.
Id.
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present southern states to permit slavery,'o and he even declared his support
in principle (though not in its details) for the controversial Fugitive Slave
Law-part of the so-called Compromise of 1850 that had earned Daniel
Webster the denunciation of abolitionists like John Greenleaf Whittier."
But Lincoln differed from Douglas on two crucial points. First, while
Douglas tried to negotiate the treacherous issue of slavery by insisting on the
right of every state and territory to determine for itself whether to permit or
forbid slavery (a decision in which the slaves themselves would have no
voice), Lincoln flatly opposed the expansion of slavery into the new
territories. By quarantining slavery in the states that had already permitted
it, he hoped to put the institution "in the course of ultimate extinction," as he
repeatedly said. 12  "I have never manifested any impatience with the
necessities that spring from the . . . actual existence of slavery amongst us
where it does already exist,"" he explained. "But I have insisted that, in
legislating for new countries, where it does not exist, there is no just rule
other than that of moral and abstract right!"1 4
Second, although Lincoln conceded that slavery was protected by the
Constitution and by subsequent legislation, and although he acknowledged
that these laws should be obeyed," he also forcefully declared his belief that
slavery was a tragic evil.'6 Indeed, his most severe indictment of Douglas,
perhaps, was not that Douglas supported measures allowing slavery, but
rather that Douglas refused even to say that slavery was wrong.' 7 Although
Lincoln challenged Douglas to take a stand on the morality of slavery,
Douglas explicitly refused to do so.' t Led apparently by the same logic that
10. See id at 20 (first debate) ("I have no purpose directly or indirectly to interfere with the
institution of slavery in the states where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have
no inclination to do so.").
11. See id. at 286 (seventh debate) ("I suppose most us-I know it of myself-believe that the
people of the Southern states are entitled to a congressional fugitive slave law, that is a right fixed in
the Constitution."). Whittier denounced Webster in the poem "Ichabod."
12. Id. at 100 (third debate); id. at 242 (sixth debate); id. at 276 (seventh debate).
13. Id. at 189 (fifth debate).
14. Id.
15. See id. at 222-23 (sixth debate) (explaining the obligation to respect constitutional laws
protecting slavery, including the Dred Scott decision in its immediate force).
16. See id. at 222 ("I suggest that the difference of opinion, reduced to its lowest terms, is no
other than the difference between the men who think slavery a wrong and those who do not think it
wrong.. . . The Republican party think it wrong. We think it is a moral, a social, and a political
wrong. We think it is a wrong not confining itself merely to the persons or the states where it exists,
but that it is a wrong in its tendency, to say the least, that extends itself to the existence of the whole
nation.").
17. See id. at 34 (first debate) ("When [Judge Douglas] invites any people willing to have
slavery, to establish it, he is blowing out the moral lights around us.... When he says he don't care
whether slavery is voted down or voted up, that it is a sacred right of self government, he is, in my
judgment, penetrating the human soul and eradicating the light of reason and the love of liberty in
this American people.").
18. In the sixth debate, Lincoln castigated Douglas for his reticence on the point. Douglas
"never says that [slavery] is wrong," Lincoln charged. Id. at 223 (sixth debate). "He has the high
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prompts some contemporary judges and scholars to suppose that religious
freedom precludes government from doing anything that might even
influence citizens' religious choices, Douglas maintained that given his
commitment to letting each state and territory decide the issue of slavery for
itself, he could not properly commend or criticize any decision that different
jurisdictions might make.19
Two precepts are discernible in Lincoln's approach to the difficult
challenge of compromising over slavery. First, he evidently believed that
accepting an existing evil is quite different than agreeing to introduce or
extend an evil where it does not presently exist. This belief, I would say,
reflected a healthy awareness of the fundamental fact, as obvious as it is
easy to overlook, memorably put by two characters in a William Steig story:
"I didn't make the world." 20 Thus, Lincoln and Douglas and their fellow-
citizens had been thrown into a world in which slavery was already a
deplorable but deeply entrenched practice. And though they could work to
contain and perhaps ultimately eliminate that practice, they had no power
simply to wish it away. Consequently, compromises that accepted the world
as it was were not impermissible. Conversely, any compromise that might
extend the evil where it did not already exist (as Douglas's "popular
sovereignty" easily might) was presumptively-though even then not
absolutely 2'-forbidden. 22
distinction, so far as I know, of never having said slavery is either right or wrong. . . . Almost
everybody else says one or the other, but the Judge never does." Id. In response, Douglas defended
his refusal to take a stance. "I do not discuss the morals of the people of Missouri, but let them settle
that matter for themselves," id. at 241, he declared, adding that
it does not become Mr. Lincoln, or anybody else, to tell the people of Kentucky that they
have no conscience, that they are living in a state of iniquity, and that they are cherishing
an institution to their bosoms in violation of the law of God. Better for him to adopt the
doctrine of "judge not lest ye be judged."
Id.
19. See id. at 241.
20. WILLIAM STEIG, THE AMAZING BONE (1976).
21. In the second debate, challenged by Douglas to say whether he would ever vote to admit a
new state as a slave state, Lincoln responded:
I state to you very frankly that I would be exceedingly sorry ever to be put in a position
of having to pass upon that question. I should be exceedingly glad to know that there
would never be another slave state admitted into the Union. . . . But I must add that if
slavery shall be kept out of the territories during the territorial existence of any one given
territory, and then the people shall, having a fair chance and a clear field when they come
to adopt the constitution, do such an extraordinary thing as to adopt a slave constitution,
uninfluenced by the actual presence of the institution among them, I see no alternative, if
we own the country, but to admit them into the Union.
THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 9, at 48 (second debate).
22. What if it were possible to make a deal in which slavery would be eliminated in two states in
return for being extended into one state in which it had not previously been permitted? What if the
919
Notice the subtle but important difference between this view and the
Margalit-Levinson principle. Under that principle, a compromise is
unacceptable if it will "establish or maintain an inhuman regime."2 3 No
distinction is acknowledged between working in a way that "maintains" an
existing evil that one did nothing to bring about and helping to "establish" or
bring into being an evil that did not previously exist. Under this principle, it
seems, there would be no room for a position like Lincoln's; everyone would
be pushed into either denying that slavery was cruel and inhuman or else
joining up with the radical abolitionists.
Lincoln's stance in the debates reflects another guiding precept: even
though he was willing to acknowledge and provisionally acquiesce in an evil
practice, he refused to relinquish his right and responsibility to declare that
the practice was in fact evil. This sort of precept might well be softened in
some contexts by the sensible requirements of diplomacy. But the precept
seems to me sensible, and perhaps even imperative, as a protection against
the very real danger that one who compromises with evil, even with the
intention of bringing about a greater good, may end up losing or forgetting
his moral commitments altogether.
Indeed, that danger may have been realized in Douglas himself. In his
perhaps well-intended desire to prevent disunion, Douglas refused to say that
slavery was wrong. He refused to make this judgment to the public and
perhaps-who knows?-even to himself. Moreover, Douglas may have
been practicing a kind of self-deception. He justified his refusal to condemn
slavery on a public-spirited ground: he wanted to preserve the Union. No
doubt this justification was sincere, and yet, . .. Douglas also wanted to be
President. Can we be sure-and more importantly, could he be sure-that
his refusal to take a stand on the crucial moral question of the day was
motivated entirely by a concern for the public good, rather than by self-
serving ambition?
In sum, Lincoln's stance suggests two precepts for compromising even
with an institution or practice one believes to be evil. First, although it is
sometimes permissible to compromise by accepting an evil practice that one
did not create, it is never (or almost never) alright to enter into a compromise
that would create or extend an evil. That guideline would stand as a major
constraint on a simple "cost-benefit" approach to the problem. Second, even
if one finds it necessary or prudent to compromise with an evil, one should
not consent to forbear from declaring one's belief that the evil is an evil.
Once again, the cost-benefit calculation is qualified by a commitment to
truth-telling-telling it to the public and, perhaps even more importantly, to
ratio of emancipation to extension were four to one, or ten to one? Would Lincoln's precept forbid
this sort of compromise? I suspect so, though the question shows how the precept might be
challenged. (I thank Larry Alexander for pressing the point.)
23. Levinson, supra note 1, at 826.
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oneself.24
Accepting these precepts at least for purposes of reflection, let us
consider Levinson's specific questions with regard to the American
Constitution.
IV. LEVINSON'S THREE CONFLICTS
Levinson asks, as others have throughout the Republic's history,
whether the enactors of the Constitution should have refused to approve it
because it accepted and protected slavery. Applying the Margalit principle
he suggests, tentatively, that they should have refused.25 A compromise that
helps to "establish or maintain an inhuman regime" is strongly presumed to
be immoral and unacceptable, and slavery was surely an inhuman regime.
This analysis seems to me misguided. Suppose that the Framers or the
northern states, jealously maintaining their own moral purity and unable to
persuade the southern states to renounce slavery, had simply refused to
approve the new Constitution. What would the result have been? At least
according to Jay's and Hamilton's analyses in the first nine of the Federalist
Papers,26 the new states would not only have lost the economic and political
benefits of a larger and consolidated republic; they would likely have faced
serious foreign threats to their independent existence and (even more
threateningly) a major risk of destructive internal warfare among the various
states.
And for what? No slaves would thereby have been freed. Indeed,
slaves themselves might have suffered in the general turmoil.
Lincoln, by contrast, did not condemn the Founders for forming the
Constitution. Under his guiding precepts, this seems a sensible position to
take. For the Founders, slavery was a deplorable but nonetheless existing
and deeply entrenched evil, and only a misplaced purity would forbid them
to enter into a mutually beneficial political arrangement--one calculated
overall to "establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty"-because it acknowledged and provisionally accepted that evil.
24. This precept admittedly raises difficult prudential questions. Surely no one is obligated to
declare one's moral convictions on all occasions and in all contexts. But when, in order to facilitate
compromise, is one warranted in keeping one's condemnations private? I doubt that there is any
simple or categorical answer to this question. (Again, I thank Larry Alexander for pressing the issue
with me.)
25. See Levinson, supra note 1, at 826.
26. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 1, 6-9 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 2-5 (John Jay). Levinson's own
surmise is not so different. Levinson, supra note 1, at 827-28.
27. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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"The exact truth is," Lincoln asserted, "that they found the institution [of
slavery] existing among us, and they left it as they found it."28
Note that this way of thinking is not equivalent to a simple cost-benefit
approach. Suppose that the southern states had consented to approve the
Constitution only on the condition that slavery be legalized throughout the
nation, even in places where it was not then permitted. Lincoln's precept
would counsel rejection of this compromise, I think, even if a sober
calculation of costs and benefits might lead to the conclusion that ratification
would on balance lead to more human happiness and avoid more human
misery (again, for the kinds of reasons suggested by Jay and Hamilton).
Levinson's second conflict involves decisions by the Supreme Court to
practice the "passive virtues," as Alexander Bickel put it,2 9 by declining to
remedy constitutional violations when the judicially-imposed remedy would
likely provoke political and cultural opposition that might actually damage
or undermine the constitutional commitment at stake. He thinks this
happened in Elk Grove School District v. Newdow,o the Pledge of
Allegiance case from a few years back, and also in Naim v. Naim,31 when in
1956 the Supreme Court declined to review a Virginia case upholding the
state's anti-miscegenation law. Levinson is not overly distressed about
Newdow because he thinks the constitutional violation was de minimis-I
would say non-existent-but he understandably finds Naim v. Naim more
troublesome.
Again, however, assuming it is true that invalidating the Virginia statute
would actually have set back the cause of racial equality by provoking
resistance and perhaps imperiling Brown itself, then I think Lincoln's
precepts would approve the Court's decision not to hear the case. After all,
the Court did not make the world that included prohibitions on interracial
marriage; by refusing to hear the case it was simply choosing not to
intervene to remedy that situation. More generally, I think Lincoln's
precepts are generally compatible with the practice of Bickel's passive
virtues. This is not surprising, because Bickel looked to Lincoln as an
example and source of his approach.32
To be sure, there will be complications. For one thing, if established
procedures allow the Court to decline jurisdiction only by declaring,
implausibly, that a case presents no substantial federal question, then such a
decision would arguably violate Lincoln's truth-telling precept. But this
consideration is itself complicated, I think, because language is
conventional, and it may be that in some contexts, a refusal to exercise
28. THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 9, at 278 (seventh debate).
29. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111 (1962).
30. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
31. 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
32. See BICKEL, supra note 29, at 65-69.
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jurisdiction ostensibly "for want of a substantial federal question" would be
intended and understood-and intended to be understood-to mean
something more like what a denial of certiorari would mean today. The "for
want of a substantial federal question" phrase might have come to have
essentially the same significance that the "swords and staves" language had
in later common law trespass writs.
Another complication is that it will not always be clear whether the
Court helped to "make the world" of which the entrenched evil is a part.
Was the Supreme Court in part responsible for the segregation culture that
supported anti-miscegenation laws-through its decision in Plessy v.
Ferguson,3 4 for example? The question raises daunting issues not only of
historical causation but also of institutional identity. To what extent should
Justices sitting on the Supreme Court in 1956 regard themselves as
implicated in the effects of Court decisions made by different Justices
generations earlier? I obviously cannot try to answer such large questions
here (or, probably, anywhere else), but instead confine myself to observing
that Lincoln's precepts seem generally friendly to the practice of the passive
virtues.
Levinson's final area of conflict concerns decisions by judges about
whether, for the sake of judicial unity, to join in opinions with which they do
not fully agree. Usually, of course, a judge can avoid this kind of conflict by
writing a dissenting opinion, or an opinion concurring in the judgment, or a
concurring opinion that joins in the majority opinion but also adds to or
clarifies it. But there are no doubt times, as Levinson observes, when a
Justice may believe it is important for the Supreme Court to present a united
front: Brown may be the outstanding example. 35 A Justice might not agree
with the outcome favored by a majority but believe that dissenting would do
a net disservice by undermining the Court's institutional authority. Or the
Justice might not like the reasoning in a majority opinion but believe it is
more important that the law be clear than that it be right in some ideal sense.
This seems by far the least grave of Levinson's conflicts, so it may seem
surprising if Lincoln's precepts, after allowing compromises with enormities
like slavery and racial injustice, suddenly balk at this kind of modest
accommodation. But one could take the view that this sort of compromise,
in which a judge joins in any opinion that he or she doesn't believe (if I can
put it that way), is forbidden by Lincoln's second, truth-telling precept. And
I can imagine cases in which that is indeed the conclusion I would reach, and
33. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 72-73, 456 (3d ed. 1990).
34. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
35. Levinson, supra note 1, at 838.
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recommend. Justice Jackson's unusual dissenting opinion in the Korematsu
case might be an (admittedly very controversial) instance.
Usually, though, other complications will cloud the matter. For one
thing, especially to the extent that there is an understood norm that a court
should speak with one voice (as Levinson says there sometimes has been, at
least aspirationally)," the fact that a judge joins in a majority opinion may
not be taken as indicating complete agreement. Rather, silent acquiescence
may be understood to mean something more like "I accept the outcome in
this case, and I accept that the reasoning in the majority opinion reflects
what a majority of my colleagues has agreed on." In addition, to the extent
that judicial opinions are understood less as "declaratory" of what "the law"
is and more as a special form of legislation, a judge who joins in an opinion
different than the one she would have preferred is no more dishonest than a
legislator who votes for a bill that isn't exactly the bill he would ideally have
favored.
V. CONCLUSION
I don't know whether the ratio of question marks to periods is higher or
lower in my comment than in Levinson's lecture. In any case, these are hard
questions, and I doubt that there are or can be tight rules for compromising.
I've suggested, though, that we can learn some precepts from Lincoln that
provide guidance, though not definitive answers, and these precepts provoke
doubts about some of Levinson's own (tentative) conclusions. Specifically,
I don't think we can properly fault or condemn the Founders for entering
into the Constitution, even though that instrument acquiesced in the evil of
slavery.
36. 323 U.S. 214, 242-48 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
37. Levinson, supra note 1, at 836-42.
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